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Abstract 
Research has found that war is likely to break out in times when leaders are high in 
power motives and low in affiliation, however research has been limited to conflicts between 
Western countries. We examine four revolutionary movements in the Philippines to examine 
whether this pattern applies to political violence across cultures and conflict types (i.e. within-
country versus between-country). We also explore the role of achievement motives in 
intranational political unrest. We gathered speeches during four times of civil unrest in the 
Philippines in order to study implicit motives at various levels of threat. All four occurred in the 
same country, city, and street in the Philippines, with some of the same actors. We scored 
speeches for power, affiliation, and achievement motives. The highest power and lowest 
affiliation motives occurred during the most violent conflict. In addition, we found that higher 
violence was associated with lower achievement motives. 
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 Political psychologists hypothesize that war is more likely to break out in times when 
power motives in leaders are high and affiliation levels are low (Winter, 1993). Power motives 
are characterized by a desire to have an impact on others, control and influence others, giving 
“unsolicited advice or help,” concerns with prestige, and creating a strong positive or negative 
emotional reaction in another person, nation, etc. (Winter, 1994). Affiliation motives are 
displayed through expressions of “similarity, unity, friendship, nurturing acts, and sadness 
brought about by someone’s departure” (Winter, 1994). Affiliation may temper power 
motivation because the individual becomes concerned about the well-being of others (McAdams, 
1985; Peterson, Winter, & Doty 1994).  
 Past research has suggested that there is a correlation between high power motivation in 
inaugural addresses and subsequent war with other countries (Winter, 1973; 1991). In addition, 
when affiliation is high, ‘arms control agreements’ are more likely to be made (Winter, 1973; 
1991). Another study found that power motivation in British and German communications rose 
in the days after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, just before World War I 
(Winter, 1993). Contrastingly, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was resolved by peaceful 
diplomatic means, had lower power-minus-affiliation motive imagery (Winter, 1993). “Thus in a 
crisis where war was possible but avoided, there was a significant shift away from the war 
motivational pattern: Power motive levels decreased and affiliation increased” (Winter, 1993, p. 
544).  In a study of eight matched-pairs of crises (one situation that led to war and one that 
avoided war), Winter (2007) found that power was significantly higher in the crises that led to 
war than in those with peaceful resolutions. Achievement was also higher in the peacefully-
resolved crises though not actually statistically significant (Winter, 2007).  
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Further studies reveal the importance of power motivation in times of crisis. Speeches, 
statements, and diary entries were scored from President James K. Polk during the dispute over 
the Oregon border with Canada, and the Mexican border with the United States (Winter, 2004). 
The Oregon issue was peacefully resolved while the Mexican border problem led to the 
Mexican-American War. Polk’s references to the Mexican border in his diary were significantly 
laden with power imagery as compared to the references to Oregon (Winter, 2004). Over time, 
Polk’s public statements about Oregon decreased in power, possibly anticipating the peaceful 
resolution of this crisis (Winter, 2004). Statements and speeches made by President Lincoln and 
Confederate leader Jefferson Davis show the same increases in power leading up to the Civil 
War (Winter, 2004).  
 Analyses of the escalation of a threat reveal similar results. Drafts of President Kennedy’s 
announcement about missiles in Cuba, his letters to Khrushchev, and the transcripts and minutes 
of ExComm (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) were scored for power, 
achievement, and affiliation (Winter, 2004). Power motive imagery decreased over the duration 
of the crisis in these materials, while affiliation imagery increased, particularly in the ExComm 
communications (Winter, 2004).   
 A third psychological motivation that perhaps may be related to the trigger of wars is 
achievement. While there is little research that examines the relationship between achievement 
motives and the beginning of war, when wars end, there is a distinct short-term drop in both 
power and achievement (Winter, 1993). Leaders with a high achievement motivation are 
concerned with excellence. Their words suggest dissatisfaction with failure, or pride at 
accomplishing something new (Winter, 1994). Those with high levels of achievement take 
moderate risks in the interest of progress rather than power, and are concerned with 
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accomplishment (Winter, 1994). Wars are obviously expensive and they waste money that could 
be used for other programs (e.g. social development). Indeed, Winter (2010a) suggests that, in 
countries with relatively few educational opportunities, achievement predicts internal violence. 
Both during and after a revolution, there is a loss of personal and social control. Uncertainty in 
the environment could cause frustration and produce a drop in the achievement motivation. 
There is admittedly some ambiguity about the potential effects of achievement motivation. 
McClelland (1975) found a positive correlation between achievement motivation and disputes 
within the United States. The current study will also examine the role of achievement in conflict, 
since more research needs to be done in this area. 
The current study. In the current study, we add to the existing literature on high power 
motives, low affiliation motives, and war, in a number of ways. This is the first study to examine 
political violence in an intranational conflict context rather than an international one. We 
specifically examine situations within one country in which there is political unrest that results in 
a change in the structure and players of the government. Thus, this study also focuses on degrees 
of threat in political unrest rather than the more black-and-white distinction of war versus peace.  
Next, this is also the first study to extend the examination of implicit motives of political 
actors into a non-Western collectivist culture (i.e. the Philippines; Hofstede, 2001), rather than a 
Western individualist one. It is not immediately clear whether power and affiliation motives 
would universally predict the severity of political conflict, and it is possible that within more 
collectivist cultures, the target of affiliation would differ (i.e. be more focused on the group or 
collective level versus the relational level; see Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Having an increased 
focus on one’s collective self could increase the salience of who is part of the ingroup versus the 
outgroup, and thus could result in more conflict. However, it is also possible that prior research 
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on power and affiliation motives represent more universal processes, and that high power and 
low affiliation would predict increased severity of conflict across cultures. These hypotheses can 
be tested against each other in the current study. 
In addition, we also examine achievement motivations in times of conflict, rather than 
only power and affiliation motives, as have been primarily focused on in past research. And 
finally, instead of relying on only established speeches by official leaders as in past research, we 
also examine if these past findings generalize to the broader discursive flow with regards to these 
unstable political times. In other words, we examine a “fuzzier” sample of political discourse that 
consists of information that became prominent enough to become part of the historical record, 
and includes speech samples from a variety of actors (e.g. politicians, religious figures, and 
everyday citizens).  
 Revolutionary movements in the Philippines. The Philippines is a republic of 7,107 
islands, divided into 16 regions, in Southeast Asia (Woods, 2006). Manila is its capital and its 
population is almost 100 million (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2011). English and Filipino 
(Tagalog) are the official languages. Roman-Catholicism is the primary religion (81%) which 
could explain why the Catholic Church was a major actor in many Philippine revolutionary 
periods. The Republic has endured many years of war against occupying forces, beginning with 
the Spanish. After the Spanish-American War, the Philippines became a U.S. territory. Filipinos 
longed to be free and fought bitterly with the Americans in the Philippine-American War of 1899 
(U.S. Library of Congress, 1991). In 1935, the United States established the Philippine 
Commonwealth but remained in charge until World War II. In 1942, Japan invaded the islands 
promising independence in exchange for cooperation (U.S. Library of Congress, 1991). The 
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United States took control again in 1944 and granted Philippine independence in 1946 (Forest & 
Forest, 1988).  
 Given its history of struggle for political independence, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Philippines has had so many revolutionary movements. In the current paper, we specifically 
focus on four revolutionary movements that occurred within 22 years of each other, within the 
same country, on the same street, with many of the same political actors involved. Each of these 
four conflicts are referred to by their popular name, “EDSA,” which is an acronym for the street 
where people gathered in protest (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue or Avenue of the Epiphany of 
the Saints; Forest & Forest, 1988). Every one of these movements occurred on this same street. 
Just as Tahrir Square and Maidan Nezalezhnosti became rallying centers in Egypt and Ukraine 
respectively, EDSA has served as the main gathering place for Philippine protests dating back to 
1986.  The number following each EDSA (1 through 4) refers to the time period in which they 
occurred. Table 1 summarizes the four conflicts, and Appendix A gives more detailed historical 
information to contextualize them. 
The EDSA revolutions are a unique set of case studies because they occurred in the same 
country, in the same city, on the same street. Many of the same actors were involved in all four 
movements because the whole span of time between EDSAs 1, 2, 3, and 4 is only 22 years. Each 
of these actors shared the goal of either overthrowing or protecting the government. Given that 
the revolutions all occurred in the same location and over similar issues, but had different 
outcomes, this is a rare opportunity to examine our hypotheses in the real world, with some 
amount of natural control.  
Briefly, EDSA 1 occurred between February 22, 1986 to February 26, 1985. President 
Ferdinand Marcos faced increasing scrutiny from Filipinos and the international community after 
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several years of martial law. In 1985, he surprised many by announcing snap elections to be held 
on February 7, 1986. His main opponent was Senator Beningo “Ninoy” Aquino. Aquino had 
been a political prisoner for years and was a popular figure in the Philippines. Shortly after he 
was released from prison, he was assassinated by Marcos’ soldiers at the Manila airport. His 
wife, Corazon Aquino took his place, vowing to continue her husband’s fight. Surprising no one, 
Marcos won reelection, much to the dismay of many Filipinos. EDSA 1 officially began on when 
two military major generals, Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos took over Camps Aguinaldo 
and Crame (Forset & Forest, 1988). Leaders of the Philippine clergy, like Cardinal Jaime Sin, 
used Radio Veritas, the only free radio station, to elicit help from ordinary citizens (Forest & 
Forest, 1988). Over 100,000 people protested government actions amidst a direct threat of 
violence, with government-ordered tanks staring them down. On February 26, 1986, Ferdinand 
Marcos fled the Philippines for Hawaii after U.S. President Ronald Reagan granted him asylum. 
EDSA 1 was a revolution that successfully removed the current president from power and 
replaced him with a new president. Although no political violence occurred, there were strong 
reasons to believe that violence could occur (See Table 1 and Appendix A). As a result, we 
classified EDSA 1’s threat of violence as moderate.  
EDSA 2 occurred between January 16, 2001 to January 20, 2001. Joseph Estrada, a 
former Philippine movie star and president from 1998 to 2001, was ousted in what became 
known as EDSA 2. Estrada was extremely corrupt and involved in many illegal activities, such 
as gambling. His downfall began when longtime friend, Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson admitted to 
funneling money into private accounts for Estrada from an illegal gambling ring called juenteng 
(AsiaWeek, 2000 October). After this revelation, the House of Congress began impeachment 
proceedings against Estrada. Following some legislative maneuvers from senators loyal to 
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Estrada, Filipinos rallied to demand his resignation.  Interestingly, many of the same figures who 
organized to bringing down Ferdinand Marcos returned to the same street (EDSA) to call for the 
end of Estrada’s presidency. Estrada remained in power until the Supreme Court, under Chief 
Justice Hilario Davide Jr., declared the Office of the President to be vacant (Villadolid & Colet-
Villadolid, 2001). On January 20, 2001, Estrada stepped down and Vice President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo became president of the Philippines. This was another revolution that 
successfully replaced the current president with a new one. However, in this case, the threat of 
violence was low, and there were no violent incidents during the revolution, which was handled 
largely through political channels. Because of this EDSA 2 was classified as low threat.  
EDSA 3 occurred from April 29, 2001 to May 2, 2001- within the first 100 days of the 
new Macapagal-Arroyo administration. Despite his personal wealth, penchant for gambling, and 
ownership of several lavish mansions, Joseph Estrada had been very popular with poor Filipinos. 
His ouster enraged many who viewed his removal as a power-grab by wealthy and connected 
elites. Following Estrada’s arrest for graft (economic plunder), his supporters took to the streets. 
On May 1, 2001, some of the senators who blocked Estrada’s impeachment led a mob of some 
50,000 down the same famous road (EDSA). The demonstrators charged down EDSA to the 
presidential palace armed with a variety of weapons. Prominent leaders from EDSAs 1 and 2 
organized a counter-revolution in support of President Macapagal-Arroyo. It took a week to quell 
the violent uprising. EDSA 3 involved the unsuccessful attempt to restore the old president to 
power. It was the only conflict that resulted in violence and death, with 8 people killed and 113 
people injured (Doronila, 2001). Because of this, we classified EDSA 3 as the only high threat 
conflict.  
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Finally, the most recent revolution, EDSA 4, occurred from February 15, 2008 to 
February 29, 2008. EDSA 4 came as a result of a scandal exposed by noted Philippine journalist 
Jarius Bondoc. Bondoc alleged that Macapagal-Arroyo administration officials awarded a state 
contract to a Chinese telecommunications firm after they were paid off with personal favors 
including money and sex. Things further unraveled for the administration when rival bidder Jose 
de Venecia III of Amsterdam Holdings Inc. testified that First Gentleman Mike Arroyo told him 
to “back off” from bidding on the state contract (de Venecia III, 2007 September 18). Arroyo 
was said to be receiving millions in kickbacks from the ZTE deal. Following further revelations 
of the First Gentleman’s involvement, protesters gathered on EDSA road to demand Macapagal-
Arroyo’s resignation. EDSA 4 involved protests calling for the resignation of the president, but 
again these protests were unsuccessful. EDSA 4 can also be considered low threat because there 
was ultimately no violence that resulted from this attempted revolution (See Appendix A for 
more details about each EDSA).  
To summarize, the threat of violence was much less in EDSAs 2 and 4 as compared to in 
EDSAs 1 and 3. In EDSA 1, people feared for their lives because the government ordered the 
military to attack protestors. EDSA 3 was the only conflict of the four that ended in extreme 
violence, death, and property damage (See Table 1 for a summary of the four EDSAs.)  
 If prior work on power motives can be generalized to collectivist cultures, then the 
power motive imagery in speeches made by leaders (both government officials and opposition 
actors) should be highest in EDSA 3, which culminated in an attack on the presidential palace 
and was objectively the most violent in terms of the number of casualties. EDSA 1 should also 
be high in power imagery, but not as high, because it led to an intense military showdown, but no 
actual deaths. Thus, we classify EDSA 1 as moderate in threat. By virtue of them all being 
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revolutionary movements, all EDSAs were somewhat threatening. However, EDSA 4 should be 
lower in power imagery because the tone of it was somewhat celebratory and it was completely 
non-violent. Thus we classify ESDA 4 as low in threat. EDSA 2 had almost no threat of 
violence, since the major drama of EDSA 2 played out in legitimate political venues (i.e. the 
House, Senate, and Supreme Court).  
If prior work on affiliation motives can be generalized to collectivist cultures, then levels 
of affiliation motive should highest during the lower threat EDSAs (EDSA 2 and 4) because they 
were the most peaceful time periods across all four periods of unrest. Affiliation should be 
lowest in EDSA 3 (highest threat) but may also be relatively low in EDSA 1 (moderate threat) 
because many people thought that violence would occur.  
As for achievement motives, it is possible that they will be lowest in EDSA 3 because the 
high level of threat will lead to a reduced need to focus on future goals.  
Method 
Implicit motives. Analyzing implicit motives in political psychology research dates back 
to the 1950s with the work of David McClelland, D.E. Berlew, and others (Winter, 2010b). 
Examining implicit motives has a number of advantages. First, it is not always possible to 
interview political/historical figures (researchers may not have access to these people, they may 
no longer be alive, etc.). Second, implicit motivations may differ from those that have been self-
reported. This is important because researchers may better understand what truly motivates a 
particular actor. Political psychologists rely upon a number of materials for analyzing implicit 
motives including, “all kinds of ‘running text’ such as speeches, letters, interviews, diplomatic 
messages, fiction, drama, and television programs” (Winter, 2010b, p. 409).    
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Data collection and preparation. We collected 63 speeches and statements made during 
EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat), 57 speeches and statements for EDSA 2 (Low Threat), 61 speeches 
and statements made for EDSA 3 (High Threat), and 98 speeches and statements for EDSA 4 
(Low Threat), for a total of 280 speeches. EDSA 3 differs slightly from the other movements 
because it has a narrower window of time and many of those involved have attempted to censor 
incriminating evidence about their roles in the movement. Most speeches made during these 
months have been removed from official senatorial websites. The case of Senator Miriam 
Defensor-Santiago, one of the key leaders of EDSA 3, is particularly startling. She has self-
censored more than two years of her own speeches. According to her one of her websites, she 
had nothing important to say from June 2, 1999 to February 19, 2002 (Defensor-Santiago, n.d.). 
Since finding materials for EDSA 3 proved to be much more difficult than the other EDSA 
movements, we relied heavily on newspapers for statements. Whenever possible, complete 
transcripts of speeches and statements were used. However, we also used excerpts from 
newspapers, magazines, and books. Since English is one of the Philippines’ official languages, 
most documents were available in English. The few speeches that were only available in Tagalog 
were translated by a native Tagalog speaker who was also fluent in English. 
 For all EDSA movements, we thoroughly surveyed many books about the Philippines 
during the times of revolution. Some are written by the actors themselves, while others are 
accounts by journalists and Philippine scholars. Other speeches are from the University of 
Manila’s Index to Philippine Periodicals which is a collection of articles from journals, 
magazines, and newspapers maintained by the university’s Rizal Library. Dr. Susan Go of the 
University of Michigan Hatcher Graduate Library sent our requests for EDSA articles to the 
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University of Manila and then relayed the search results back. For further assistance, we also 
consulted experts on Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Michigan.   
We also conducted Internet searches using Google, LexisNexis, Proquest, Infotrac, 
Ask.com, and YouTube. We used key search words like ‘EDSA’, ‘Philippines + revolution’, and 
surnames of leaders like Marcos, Aquino, and Macapagal-Arroyo. Some of our speeches come 
from government websites while others are from newspapers or news organizations both in the 
Philippines and abroad like CNN, the BBC, ABS-CBN (Alto Broadcasting System-Chronicle 
Broadcasting Network) and GMA News (major news network in the Philippines), and 
Newsweek. We also collected records of the actual impeachment proceedings in the Philippine 
Legislature. Such speeches were made by Philippine Senators, Representatives, and the Supreme 
Court Chief Justice.  
Many of these speeches were made by government figures and opposition leaders, though 
we included speeches and statements from ordinary participants whenever available. See Table 2 
for more information on the speeches. A copy of all collected speeches is available upon request 
from the first author.  
For each movement, we only examined the speeches made during specific time frames:  
EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat) was spawned by Marcos’ snap elections announcement on 
November 3, 1985, and the revolution ended on February 26, 1986 after 4 days of protesting in 
the streets.  
EDSA 2 (Low Threat) happened largely because of the damaging testimony of Luis 
‘Chavit’ Singson about Estrada’s illegal gambling habits. Singson made his statements on 
October 9, 2000, so we used this as the start date for speech collection. The actual conflict began 
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on January 16, 2001 after the 11 senators blocked Estrada’s impeachment, and ended on January 
20, 2001 when he stepped down.  
Trouble began for Macapagal-Arroyo virtually as soon as she assumed office. Speeches 
from the period of April 1, 2001 to May 14, 2001 were included for EDSA 3 (High Threat). The 
critical event that led to EDSA 3 was Estrada’s arrest on April 25, 2001, although tensions had 
been building since his removal. The actual conflict began on April 29th. On May 2nd, 
Macapagal-Arroyo declared that she had control of the government, but Manila was still a very 
dangerous climate. We include the time up until the May 14th elections because this is really 
when things quieted down.  
For EDSA 4 (Low Threat), the critical event was Jarius Bondoc’s piece in the Philippine 
Star on August 27, 2007. We have decided to include speeches made up to two weeks after the 
February 29th Interfaith Rally, so speeches were collected for EDSA 4 up until March 15, 2008. 
See Appendix A for historical details on each conflict and Table 1 for a summary of the four 
EDSA incidents.  
Content Coding and Motive Scoring. In order to ensure blind coding, we removed any 
identifiers of speaker and date and gave each speech an identifying number. Utterances of 14 
words or more were included, consistent with prior research (Veroff, Atkinson, Feld, & Gurin, 
1960).1 We used the prescribed methods from the Manual for scoring motive imagery in running 
text: Version 4.2 (Winter, 1994) in order to analyze the motives in the speeches.  
 We now use power motive as an example to illustrate how to score the speeches. For 
each speech, we first counted the number of power images. This is referred to as the Raw Power 
score. Then, we counted the total number of words per speech (Word Count). To attain the 
power imagery score, we used the following formula: Power imagery=(Raw Power/Word 
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Count)*1000 (Winter, 1994). The Power imagery score gives the rate of power images per one 
thousand words. This method was repeated for the affiliation and achievement imageries. It is 
important to use a calculation that accounts for word count because of the marginally different 
average length of speeches across the four EDSA periods, F(3,275)=.248, p=.06 (see Table 2 for 
means).  
Interscorer agreement. We randomly selected 60 of the speeches (approximately 21% of 
the total) representing all four revolutions for the purposes of checking interscorer agreement. 
Another coder who was blind to the hypotheses of our study and unaware of the history of the 
Philippines was trained to use the Manual for scoring motive imagery in running text: Version 
4.2 (Winter, 1994). There was high intercoder reliability for power motives (α=.96), affiliation 
motives (α=.96), and achievement motives (α=.86). 
Results 
Part 1: How EDSAs are related to motive imagery scores. 
One way to address our research question is to examine the effect of each EDSA on the 
motive imagery scores. Thus, for Part 1 analyses, we first conducted an ANOVA examining the 
effect of EDSA on each type of motive, and in the case of significant effects, ran contrasts to 
examine the specific mean differences.  
Power motive imagery.  
Since the omnibus ANOVA of EDSA on power motive imagery was statistically 
significant, F(3,275)=40.51, p<.001, we conducted planned contrasts examining differences 
between each EDSA pair. All means were significantly different from each other, ps<.01. We 
found that power motive imagery was highest when the threat of violence was highest in EDSA 
3 (M=28.59), and was lowest when threat was lowest in EDSAs 2 and 4 (Ms=13.14 and 7.74 
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respectively). The power motive imagery in the moderate threat conflict, EDSA 1 (M=19.57), 
was in between the power motive imagery from the other three movements. In other words, we 
found support for the hypothesis that the greater the threat of violence, the higher the power 
motive imagery (See Figure 1).  
Affiliation motive imagery.  
Since the omnibus ANOVA was statistically significant, F(3,275)=3.96, p=.009, we 
again conducted planned contrasts examining the effect of the EDSA conflicts on affiliation 
motive imagery. We found that affiliation motive imagery was highest in EDSA 2 (Low Threat; 
M=9.00), which differed significantly from both EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat: M=4.69) and EDSA 
3 (High Threat: M=3.13), ps<.02. The other low threat conflict (EDSA 4: M=6.11) was 
marginally lower than EDSA 2 (Low Threat), p=.07, but marginally higher than the high threat 
conflict (EDSA 3), p=.06. Taken together, this provides some support for the hypothesis that the 
lower the threat of violence, the higher the affiliation motive (See Figure 1).  
Achievement motive imagery.  
Since we did not have firm a priori hypotheses about achievement motives, we ran a post 
hoc Fisher’s LSD test after finding significant results in the omnibus ANOVA, F(3,275)=5.31, 
p=.001. Even so, there were interesting significant differences between the EDSA movements in 
achievement motive imagery. Achievement motive imagery was lowest in EDSA 3 (High 
Threat: M=1.77), which had significantly lower achievement imagery than EDSAs 1 (Moderate 
Threat: M=6.57) and 2 (Low Threat: M=5.46), ps<.01, and non-significantly lower achievement 
imagery than EDSA 4 (Low Threat: M=3.56), p=.13. Overall, while the achievement motive 
pattern is less clear than the other two motives, there is some evidence that the highest threat 
(EDSA 4) had the lowest level of achievement motive imagery (See Figure 1).  
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Controlling for potential moderators.  
We next examined whether certain features of the speeches affected these results. For all 
analyses reported below, we first conducted a -square analysis examining whether there were 
differences in the proportion of speeches from each gender (male versus female speaker), 
conflict side (pro-government versus anti-government), speaker status (political actor or not), or 
speech source (newspaper or not) across the four EDSAs. We next ran an ANOVA examining 
whether each of these variables moderated the direct effect of EDSA on each of the three types 
of motives.  
Gender. There were the most male speakers (87.3%) in EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat) and 
the least male speakers (63.9%) in EDSA 3 (High Threat), (3)=9.99, p=.02, with EDSA 2 and 4 
(Low Threat) in between them (78.9% and 78.5% respectively). However, there were no 
interactions between gender and EDSA movement on any of the motives, ps>.15.  
Conflict side. There were no differences in the proportion of pro-government versus anti-
government people represented across the EDSAs, (3)=5.97, p=.11. However, the interactions 
between conflict side and EDSA movements were significant for achievement motive imagery, 
F(3,271)=2.68, p=.05, and affiliation motive imagery, F(3,271)=2.97, p=.03 (power motive 
interaction: p=.40).  
Speaker status. There was a marginally higher percentage of political speakers in the low 
threat conflicts (84.2% in EDSA 2, and 79.6% in EDSA4) compared to the moderate (EDSA 1: 
65.1%) and high threat (EDSA 3: 72.1%) EDSAs, (3)=7.32, p=.06. In addition, political 
speakers had lower power motive imageries (M=16.63) than other speakers (M=19.81), but this 
was qualified by an interaction such that this was only true within the highest threat EDSA, 
F(3,271)=5.00, p=.002. No other main effects or interactions emerged, ps>.20.  
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Speech source. There was a higher proportion of newspaper sources in the high threat 
conflict (EDSA 3: 77.0%) compared to the other three conflicts (EDSA 1: 57.1%; EDSA 2: 
49.1%; EDSA 4: 57.1%),χ(3)=10.73, p=.01. In addition, newspapers (M=3.65) had lower 
achievement imageries than other sources (M=5.62), F(1,271)=4.42, p=.04 (all other main 
effects, ps>.21). The interaction between source and ESDA movement was significant for power 
motives only, F(3,271)=4.86, p=.003 (all other interactions, ps>.15).  
Entering covariates into original models. Taken together, there are no clear or predicted 
patterns with respect to the proportion of these variables, or their effect on the motive imageries. 
However, because there were a few unexpected main effects and interactions, we examined 
whether the effects obtained in Part 1 would remain when controlling for gender, conflict side, 
speaker status, and speech source. Thus, ANOVAs were conducted examining the effect of the 
EDSAs on power, affiliation, and achievement motives when controlling for these variables. 
Adding these covariates to the ANOVAs did not change any results reported in Part 1. All 
significant outcomes remained significant after including these covariates, and means changed 
only slightly.  
Part 2: Predicting the probability of a violent outcome. 
In this section, we examined the extent to which the motives could predict the periods of 
civil unrest that ended peacefully versus in violence. We did so by conducting a series of four 
stepwise logistic regression analyses with violent outcome as the dependent measure (1=yes: 
applies to EDSA 3 only, 0=no: applies to all other EDSAs). In Step 1, all three motives were 
simultaneously entered as predictors, and in Step 2, one of the covariates was entered into the 
model. Four separate models are needed because there were four different covariates, some of 
which had missing values.  
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Overall, there was an 8% increase in the probability of a violent outcome for every unit 
increase in power motive density, β=.08, p<.001, [O.R.=1.08, C.I. 1.06, 1.11], a 4% decline in 
the probability of violence for every unit increase in affiliation density, β=-.04, p=.086, 
[O.R.=0.96, C.I. 0.92, 1.01], and a 6% decline in the probability of violence for every unit 
increase in achievement density, β=-.07, p=.03, [O.R.=0.94, C.I. 0.88, 0.99]. 
 For power motive density, this relationship remained significant when considering each 
of the covariates, ps<.001. For affiliation motive density, the marginal relationship remained 
similar or was slightly attenuated when each covariate was added to the model, ps=.086 to .11. 
For achievement motive density, gender, conflict side, and speaker status had no effect on the 
result, ps=.03. However, when speech source was added as a covariate, it slightly attenuated the 
relationship, p=.06.  
Part 3: Changes from beginning to end of crisis periods. 
 In Part 3, we examined whether motive patterns changed from the beginning to the end of 
the periods of political unrest, depending upon whether they ended violently (coded as 1: only 
applies to EDSA 3) or peacefully (coded as 0: applies to all other EDSAs). To do so, we first 
coded the first speech in each EDSA as 0, then for each subsequent speech, counted the number 
of days from the first speech in that same EDSA period (see Table 1 for each of the EDSA’s 
dates). We next conducted a stepwise regression analysis with the main effects of violence 
(1=yes, 0=no) and days from the start of the EDSA (centered) entered in Step 1, and their 
interaction entered in Step 2. Dependent measures were the motive density scores. Most 
pertinent to this research question is the interaction term, since it represents changes that 
occurred over time in violent versus non-violent crises. 
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 The interaction term was significant for power motives, β=1.06, p=.047. For EDSAs that 
ended non-violently, power motives significantly declined from the beginning to the end of the 
crisis period, r(218)=-.25, p<.001. However, for the crisis that ended violently (EDSA 3), there 
was a non-significant tendency for power densities to be rising over the crisis period, r(61)=.19, 
p=.15. For affiliation motive density, there was no significant interaction, β=.37, p=.52, nor did 
the correlations between affiliation density and days from the start of the crisis approach 
significance (non-violent: r(218)=.08, p=.24; violent: r(61)=.12, p=.37. For achievement motive 
density, the interaction was again not significant, β=-.73, p=.23. However, it is notable that 
although there was no significant change in achievement motives and from the beginning to the 
end of non-violent crises, r(218)=-.09, p=.17, there was a significant correlation in the violent 
crisis, r(61)=-.36, p=.005. Achievement density scores in the crisis that ended violently (i.e. 
EDSA 3) significantly declined from the beginning to the end of the crisis.  
Discussion 
 After analyzing the speeches in each EDSA conflict, we find that power imagery was 
highest in the most violent time of civil unrest, and that affiliation imagery was highest in the 
conflicts with the lowest threat of violence. We also confirm the tentative prediction that 
achievement imagery was lowest when the threat of violence was highest. Moreover, in logistic 
regression analyses predicting the probability of violence occurring, these results are 
conceptually replicated: violence is more likely to occur in the presence of higher power motive 
densities, marginally lower affiliation densities, and lower achievement densities. Finally, we 
also examined whether motive density scores changed across the crises, depending upon whether 
they ended violently or not. We found that the crisis that ended violently (i.e. EDSA 3) had 
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declines in achievement motives across the crisis period, and the non-violent crises had declines 
in power motive across each crisis period. 
These particular movements provided a unique opportunity to study implicit motives at 
various levels of threat with a number of natural controls in place. They happened in the same 
country, in the same city, on the same street (EDSA, Manila, Philippines). Some of the same 
actors were involved in all four movements. They also all shared the same purpose: to overthrow 
the government. The movements even occurred relatively close together in time; the whole span 
of time across all four EDSAs is only 22 years. We have used four cases with relatively low, 
moderate, and high threat of violence for our study.  
To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine an Eastern collectivist culture for the 
power, affiliation, and achievement motivations in political speeches. Most of the literature 
focuses on events between Western nations and large traditional military powers (the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the U.S. Civil War, World War I, etc.). We extend this analysis to include a non-
Western sample and find conceptually parallel results. We also find that power, affiliation, and 
achievement are not just relevant to studying war and peace between two countries. 
Psychological motivations are important to understanding times of civil unrest within a country 
as well. Finally, in this study we also examine speech samples from a variety of people, and not 
simply key political actors as in past research. 
 Van Inwegen (2006) posits that three conditions must be met to have a successful ‘velvet 
revolution’ (non-violent movement). He used EDSA 1 to test this model. These conditions are 
reproduced and explained in the context of implicit motivations. “Successful velvet revolutions 
occur when (1) dissidents committed to nonviolence are (2) sufficiently organized to successfully 
provoke the state into (3) ineffectively repressing dissidents or inadequately implementing 
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reform” (Van Inwegen, 2006, p. 191). We see that, although power is highest relative to the other 
motives in EDSA 1, it is perhaps tempered by the achievement motivation. Concern for 
excellence could prompt people to look for non-violent forms of competition and avoid all-out 
war (Winter, 2007). Clearly, the dissidents in EDSA 1 were well-organized because they brought 
about a revolution. Reflecting the motivations of the society may be why they were so successful 
in mobilizing and sustaining support for Marcos’ ouster.  
We examine the relationship between achievement motivation to threat levels within 
conflicts, which has been less frequently studied in this context than power and affiliation. EDSA 
3, the most violent movement, had a significantly lower level of achievement, although more 
research needs to be done in order to further explore the relationship between threat of violence 
and achievement motives. Why do we see such a low achievement motivation in EDSA 3? 
Perhaps people lose their achievement motivation and focus instead of attaining power as 
violence gets worse. Or, as noted in the introduction, perhaps the loss of personal and social 
control (loss of certainty) during and after revolutions creates frustration and anxiety which 
could drop achievement levels (Winter, 2010a). We recommend future studies to also include 
achievement motivation because it may be more important than previously thought.  
Limitations. It is important to note that EDSA 3 is slightly different from the other three 
movements in other ways than the presence of violence in it. It was less organized than the other 
movements, and those who participated were largely poor instead of middle class people and 
elites. The elites who did lead the movement were accused of politicking for the May 14th 
elections Estrada had created (See Appendix A for historical context). 
 Another possible limitation of this analysis is that our speeches are unlikely to form a 
representative sample. We collected these speeches from a variety of academic and accredited 
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sources to ensure, as best as we could, that these speeches represented a broad selection of 
potential actors. We sampled from the time before the movements, during the movements, and 
after the movements. Since we do not have an index of every speech ever made during the time 
frames though, we cannot truly sample randomly. However we did our best to be thorough in 
data collection, and as we found and added more data, our effects only became more 
pronounced. 
While the evidence does suggest a correlation between high power / low affiliation and 
subsequent political violence, it is important to present possible alternative explanations for the 
EDSA movements. The Philippine government is similar to the United States but there are some 
relevant differences worth noting. The presidential and vice presidential candidates run on 
separate tickets. The winners are often from competing parties which creates a natural division in 
the government (Woods, 2006). It is akin to constantly having to look over your shoulder. In 
1998, Fidel Ramos attempted to get rid of term limits in the constitution because he feared the 
idea of a presidency run by Joseph Estrada, the vice president (Woods, 2006). Macapagal-Arroyo 
became president after Estrada’s removal and she was one of his fiercest critics. She was also 
from an opposing party (Woods, 2006). Maybe the institutional instability of the Philippine 
government has fueled the EDSA movements, rather than some intrinsic lust for power on the 
part of its leaders. Perhaps the leaders are simply reacting to threats from political challengers, 
and not being spurred on solely by their own psychological motivations. However, the fact that 
we found our predicted effects even when controlling for speaker status (political actor or not), 
makes this explanation less likely.  
 Implications. This analysis may have relevance to understanding the motivations of 
leaders in government and those of opposition actors, with the potential implication that 
                                PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND POLITICAL UNREST 23
outcomes of these kinds of conflicts may become more predictable over time as more research 
accrues. Power is highest in EDSA 3, which may explain why EDSA 3 ended violently. EDSA 1 
had higher levels of power relative to other motivations and it very nearly became bloody. The 
EDSA 1 atmosphere was far more dangerous than in EDSA 2 and EDSA 4. People were fighting 
to remove a murderous dictator. In EDSA 2, people protested in the streets to remove a corrupt 
but officially elected president. In all movements, with the exception of EDSA 4, power was 
highest relative to the other motivations. This may simply suggest that the environment was right 
for a movement. If power motive imageries were not higher, civil unrest may be less likely to 
occur because this could indicate fewer problems with the ruling administration.  
  We chose the EDSAs because they provided uncanny natural controls for each other. 
They all occurred in the Philippines on the same street with many of the same actors involved. 
Cultural differences are controlled in this study because the movements all took place in the 
same country.  
Future studies on civil unrest and motive imagery could be directed towards any civilian 
demonstration where change in the government is desired. Other such examples that come to 
mind include the Velvet Revolution in what was Czechoslovakia, Bloody Sunday in Northern 
Ireland, any of the color revolutions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and especially the recent 
wave of civilian-led protests for democracy and reform in Ukraine and across the Middle East 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Iran). There are indeed many similarities between the 
Egyptian revolution that removed President Hosni Mubarak from power and EDSA 1 with the 
downfall of Ferdinand Marcos. Both leaders were strong allies of the United States. Both were in 
power for decades, and both saw their presidencies come to an end from the peaceful assembly 
of the citizens of their countries, free from foreign interference. It would be helpful to study all 
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of the regions we mentioned because they all have such different cultures, values, and traditions. 
They could provide further evidence for the generalization of the role of power and affiliation 
motives in political conflict.  
When studying political violence, it is important to make the distinction between warring 
countries and warring factions within a country. Warring factions within a country can lead to 
civil unrest and possibly revolution. Studying intra-national conflicts relative to expressed 
motive imagery provides a way to predict the outcome of a demonstration. When power is high, 
violence is more likely to occur. When affiliation is high, peaceful protests are typically allowed 
by the government and a peaceful transition of power can perhaps take place.  
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Table 1: Summary of the four EDSA incidents 
 
 EDSA 1: 
Moderate 
EDSA 2:  
Low 
EDSA 3:  
High 
EDSA 4:  
Low 
Movement 
Duration 
February 22, 1986 to  
February 26, 1986 
January 16, 2001 to 
January 20, 2001 
April 29, 2001 to  
May 2, 2001 
February 15, 2008 to 
February 29, 2008 
Time of Study November 3, 1985 to February 26, 1986 October 9, 2000 to January 20, 2001 April 1, 2001 to May 14, 2001 August 27, 2007 to March 15, 2008 
Issues involved Revolution to remove Marcos from 
power. Ending a 
dictatorship. 
Revolution to 
remove a corrupt 
president who used 
government money 
for illegal gambling. 
Revolution to restore 
ousted president of 
EDSA 2. To remove 
Macapagal-Arroyo 
from power. 
Rallies to encourage 
president to resign 
over National 
Broadband Network 
scandal. 
Outcome New government is installed. Corazon 
Aquino becomes 
president. 
New government is 
installed. 
Macapagal-Arroyo 
becomes president. 
Government stays in 
power. Macapagal-
Arroyo maintains 
presidency. 
Government stays in 
power. Macapagal-
Arroyo maintains 
presidency. 
Threat of 
Violence 
Moderate Low Highest Low 
Did Violence 
Occur? 
No, although there 
were tanks in the 
streets and fear that 
violence would 
occur. 
No Yes: 8 people killed 
and 113 people 
injured. Property 
damages were high. 
No 
Critical Event Snap elections announced after 
scrutiny of 
dictatorship (Nov. 3, 
1985). 
Singson’s revelation 
that Estrada was 
involved in illegal 
gambling (Oct. 9, 
2000). 
Estrada’s arrest (Apr. 
25, 2001). 
Phil Star journalist 
Jarius Bondoc’s 
exposé on the NBN 
deal with Chinese-
based firm ZTE 
(August 27, 2007). 
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Table 2: Summary of the speeches collected for each EDSA incident 
 
 EDSA 1: Moderate 
N=63 
EDSA 2: Low 
N=57 
EDSA 3: High 
N=61 
EDSA 4: Low 
N=98 
Speaker All were involved in EDSA 1 All were involved in EDSA 2 All were involved in EDSA 3 All were involved in EDSA 4 
Language 63 speeches in English 57 speeches in English 58 speeches in English 
3 speeches in 
Tagalog 
97 speeches in 
English 
1 speech in 
Tagalog 
Source 25 from books, 36 from newspapers, 2 from 
magazines 
18 from books, 28 
from newspapers, 
1 from a website, 
3 from 
government 
documents, 7 
from magazines 
5 from books, 47 
from newspapers, 1 
from a website, 7 
from government 
documents, 1 from 
a magazine 
56 from 
newspapers, 9 
from websites, 33 
from government 
documents 
Time Period November 3, 1985 to February 3, 1986 (15 
weeks, 3 days) 
October 9, 2000 
to January 20, 
2001 (14 weeks, 3 
days) 
April 1, 2001 to 
May 14, 2001 (6 
weeks, 1 day) 
August 27, 2007 
to March 15, 2008 
(28 weeks, 5 days) 
Conflict side 24 pro-government, 39 anti government 21 pro-government, 
36 anti-
government 
32 pro-
government, 
29 anti-government 
51 pro-
government, 
47 anti-
government 
Gender of 
speaker 
55 male, 8 female 45 male, 12 
female 
40 male, 21 female 73 male, 20 
female 
Type of speaker 41 government or former government actors, 22 
others (clergy, journalist, 
military, everyday person) 
48 government or 
former 
government 
actors, 9 others 
(clergy, journalist, 
military, everyday 
person) 
44 government or 
former government 
actors, 17 others 
(clergy, journalist, 
military, everyday 
person) 
78 government or 
former 
government 
actors, 20 others 
(clergy, journalist, 
military, everyday 
person) 
Average length 
of speeches (SD) 
233.32 (715.85) 493.37 (638.47) 254.07 (405.47) 374.26 (579.07) 
Power density 
(SD) 
19.57 (13.56) 13.14 (12.09) 28.59 (15.78) 7.74 (7.43) 
Affiliation 
density (SD) 
4.69 (8.85) 9.00 (9.15) 3.13 (7.13) 6.11 (11.59) 
Achievement 
density (SD) 
6.57 (10.54) 5.46 (7.93) 1.77 (3.37) 3.56 (6.03) 
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Figure 1: Mean imagery scores for power, affiliation, and achievement at various levels of 
threat. 
 
    
Note: Capped bars denote standard errors.  
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Appendix A: Historical background of four EDSA movements.  
The instability of the newly independent Philippine state created a need for a dynamic 
leader who could take control. In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos became president of the Philippines. 
He promised to revitalize the country by providing social programs and economic reforms 
(Meimban, 1999). The people of the Philippines did initially benefit from Marcos’ leadership. 
However, it was not long before he became mired in scandal. His administration was run by 
people hired through nepotism and cronyism. His wife, Imelda, was the head of many different 
government agencies (Forest and Forest 1988). His cousin, Fabian Ver, was eventually appointed 
Chief of Staff of the Armed Services (Forest & Forest, 1988). Due to increased anxiety about his 
political future, Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972 (Forest & Forest, 1988). He 
maintained his vice grip on the country for the next thirteen years. 
 In 1985, under increasing scrutiny from both Filipinos and the international community, 
Marcos announced snap elections to be held on February 7, 1986 (Buss, 1987). People were 
tense and afraid that the election would be marred by fraud. Marcos was known for doing 
anything to keep power and control. His major political opponent was the recently widowed 
Corazon Aquino. Aquino’s husband, Benigno (better known as Ninoy), had been Marcos’ chief 
political opponent. After serving several years in jail as a political prisoner, he was exiled for 
another three years. Upon his return home, he was assassinated by Marcos’ soldiers at the Manila 
airport (Buss, 1987). Marcos attempted to deny his involvement but everyone knew he ordered 
Ninoy’s death because the whole scene had been captured on video. 
 As expected, Corazon Aquino lost the 1986 election due to Marcos’ cheating. Leaders of 
the opposition were tired of the corruption and tyranny of the Marcos regime. Thus, in February 
of 1986, the citizens of the Philippines decided they could no longer accept Marcos’ dictatorship. 
                                PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND POLITICAL UNREST 34
They launched a bloodless coup. On February 22, 1986, two major generals, Defense Minister 
Juan Ponce Enrile and Lt. General Fidel Ramos, defected from Marcos’ army and took over 
Camps Aguinaldo and Crame (Forset & Forest, 1988). Leaders of the Philippine clergy, like 
Cardinal Sin, used Radio Veritas, the only free radio station, to elicit help from ordinary citizens 
(Forest & Forest, 1988). Over one hundred thousand answered the call. They rallied outside of 
Camp Crame in support of Ramos and Enrile. They brought food and supplies to the troops 
inside the camp. Marcos ordered his army to attack the camp. People formed human chains to 
block the tanks. The mood was tense and as seen in the quote below, people feared for their 
lives. Participant Amado Lacuesta recalled the showdown:  
I linked arms with the men on either side of me. Some of us were weeping, some cursing. 
The APC jerked forward. Men braced themselves against the advancing metal wall, 
trying to hold it back. The nuns were still on their knees, praying. The soldier continued 
to motion the APC to move on and I wondered how many of us would be crushed before 
they realized that we meant to stay or before the pile of bodies made it impossible for the 
APC to continue (Lacuesta in Forest & Forest, 1988 p. 98).  
 
Eventually, Marcos fled the country and lived out the rest of his life in Hawaii (Forest & 
Forest, 1988). This movement became known as EDSA 1. EDSA is an acronym for the street 
where people gathered in protest (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue or Avenue of the Epiphany of 
the Saints; Forest & Forest, 1988). 
 In 2001, Filipinos ousted another president in what has become known as EDSA 2. 
Joseph Estrada was president of the Philippines from 1998 to 2001 (Doronila, 2001). He earned 
the citizens’ ire because he was extremely corrupt and involved in many illegal activities, such as 
gambling. Estrada had many mistresses and kept lavish mansions for them all across the country 
(Woods, 2006).  
 Estrada’s downfall began when longtime friend, Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson admitted to 
funneling money into private accounts for Estrada from an illegal gambling ring called juenteng 
                                PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVES AND POLITICAL UNREST 35
(AsiaWeek, 2000 October). Estrada further incriminated himself when he set up an account 
under an assumed name. This account contained millions of dollars (Villadolid & Colet-
Villadolid, 2001). Outraged by Estrada’s actions, the House of Congress made moves to impeach 
him. House Leader Manuel Villar read the articles of impeachment during an opening prayer 
(Villadolid & Colet-Villadolid, 2001). Proceedings moved on to the Senate. Estrada’s 
impeachment was blocked by 11 senators who were loyal to him. This action enraged Filipinos, 
and under the direction of prominent leaders from EDSA 1, they marched to the famed road to 
protest once more. 
 Estrada became desperate to hold onto power. He announced snap elections to be held on 
May 14, 2001. This is reminiscent of Ferdinand Marcos’ last ditch effort to save his presidency 
(Crisostomo, 2002, p. 63). Estrada remained in power until the Supreme Court, under Chief 
Justice Hilario Davide Jr., declared the Office of the President to be vacant (Villadolid & Colet-
Villadolid, 2001). On January 20, 2001, Estrada stepped down and Vice President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo became president of the Philippines. Many people in the Philippines were 
extremely unhappy when Estrada was forced out of office. Ironically, Estrada had built his career 
as a champion of the poor (Doronila, 2001). He had a huge following among impoverished 
Filipinos. Macapagal-Arroyo on the other hand, was thought to be an elite who, with the help of 
other elites, pushed out a duly elected president. There are still serious questions about the 
constitutionality of Estrada’s removal. 
 After Macapagal-Arroyo’s first 100 days in office, yet another EDSA revolution was 
launched. On April 25, 2001, Estrada was arrested for graft (economic plunder) which enraged 
his supporters (Doronila, 2001, p. 221). Tensions were escalating and people gathered to protest. 
On May 1, 2001, some of the senators who blocked Estrada’s impeachment led a mob of some 
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50,000 down EDSA. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was one of the more well-known leaders as he 
was instrumental in causing Marcos’ downfall. The demonstrators charged down EDSA to 
Malacañang, presidential palace. Noted journalist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Amando 
Doronila, described the event. “Armed with stones, tear gas, truncheons, lead pipes, molotov 
bombs, and sumpak (crudely made guns), they stormed the gates of Malacañang” (Doronila, 
2001, p. 221). Prominent leaders from EDSAs 1 and 2 organized a counter-revolution in support 
of President Macapagal-Arroyo. It took a week to quell the violent uprising. As a result of EDSA 
3, eight people were killed, 113 people were injured, and property damages were estimated to 
exceed P100 million (Doronila, 2001, p. 142). At least 60 people were arrested including many 
of the senators (Crisostomo, 2002, p. 142). 
  While the Macapagal-Arroyo administration maintained power after the failed EDSA 3, 
the next seven years would prove to be very tumultuous indeed. Her administration had been 
plagued by scandals including allegations of election fraud, operating outside the bounds of the 
constitution, and questionable deals with government contractors. Her husband Jose Miguel 
“Mike” Arroyo has frequently been at the center of these corruption allegations.  
On August 27, 2007, Philippine Star journalist, Jarius Bondoc wrote a scathing piece 
about the newly established contract between Chinese firm, Zhong Xing Telecommunication 
Equipment Company (ZTE) and the Philippine government. The contract set up a national 
broadband network for government use (Bondoc, 2007 August 27). The contract cost the 
government an estimated $329 million (P15 billion) (Padilla, 2007 August 29) which far 
exceeded rival bids. 
 Bondoc’s article alleged that Commission on Elections (COMELEC) chairman Benjamin 
Abalos had been meeting privately with ZTE officials in China and was lavished with monetary 
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gifts and sexual favors (Bondoc, 2007 August 27). This was all to curry favor so he would push 
the ZTE contract for approval with National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) 
Secretary Romulo Neri. It worked. The contract was signed in April of 2007.  
 Upon reading Bondoc’s piece, Nueva Vizcaya Representative Carlos Padilla demanded 
answers about why the contract was so overpriced. Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel Jr. 
called for the Senate to investigate the ZTE deal. Things really looked bad for Abalos when rival 
bidder Jose de Venecia III of Amsterdam Holdings Inc., testified that he also met with Abalos in 
China. He told the Senate that he overheard Abalos asking for kickbacks from ZTE (GMA 
News, 2008 February 7). He also alleged that Abalos had wire-tapped his phone and threatened 
his life over the rights to the national broadband network contract. 
 Had the scandal only involved Benjamin Abalos, it is likely that nothing would have 
come of the ZTE –NBN fiasco. On September 18, 2007, de Venecia III alleged that First 
Gentleman Mike Arroyo told him to “back off” from the national broadband network bidding (de 
Venecia III, 2007 September 18). Arroyo was said to be receiving millions in kickbacks from the 
ZTE deal. It got worse for the First Gentleman when former NEDA consultant Rodolfo “Jun” 
Lozada came forward to support the testimony of de Venecia III. Several impeachment 
complaints were filed against the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. Critics alleged that the 
president used her power to ratify a deal which directly benefited her husband at the expense of 
the Filipino taxpayers.  
After the Lozada testimony, the same organizers of the previous EDSAs came together 
again to demand that the president resign. Interestingly, many of these organizers were on 
opposite sides during the other movements. They came together with the common goal of 
demanding Macapagal-Arroyo's resignation. On February 15, 2008, protesters gathered in 
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Makati City, a business district in Metro Manila. Officials estimated the total to be around ten 
thousand but rally leaders claimed the figure was closer to thirty thousand (GMA News, 2008 
February 15).  
Protests continued throughout the month and came to a head on February 29, 2008 at the 
Interfaith Rally in Manila. The Interfaith Rally was led by former President Corazon Aquino and 
deposed former President Joseph Estrada as well as religious leaders, and several activist groups. 
Counter-revolutionaries also gathered in support of Macapagal-Arroyo.  Police officials 
estimated that twelve thousand to fifteen thousand people showed up while others put the 
numbers higher at eighty thousand to one hundred thousand (ABS-CBN News, 2008 February 
29). People sang songs, laughed and clapped, carried banners and flags, released balloons, and 
danced in the streets, all calling for the president's resignation. Several participants captured the 
events on cell phones and other mobile devices. They have since put the clips onto YouTube. 
The mood was mostly positive and upbeat but undertones of frustration with Macapagal-Arroyo 
could be seen and felt (einthar, 2008a February 29; einthar, 2008b February 29; einthar, 2008c, 
February 29; einthar, 2008 March 2). For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the Makati 
City rally and the Interfaith Rally as EDSA 4. It should also be noted that the very influential 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) stood in support of the administration. 
They drafted a letter encouraging the president to make some government reforms. 
 Things quieted down in the coming weeks after Macapagal-Arroyo revoked her 
controversial Executive Order No. 464 which banned government officials from testifying 
without her prior approval. This was seen as a good faith effort to abide by the recommendations 
of the CBCP.  The ZTE scandal officially came to an end when the Supreme Court dismissed 
petitions against the government for the broadband contract. Macapagal-Arroyo had cancelled 
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the deal so the Justices reasoned that this was sufficient to dismiss the petitions (GMA News, 
2008 July 14). People were still less that satisfied with the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. A 
survey conducted by Pulse Asia found that 42% of Filipinos believed she was the most corrupt 
president in the history of the Philippines (GMA News, 2007 December 11). 
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Endnote 
                                                            
1 Note that the density score calculation automatically controls for speech length. When we only 
include speeches of 50 words or more, results remain relatively consistent. For power density, 
EDSA 3 (High Threat: M=19.63) and EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat: M=18.46) have the highest 
scores, ps<.001, and do not differ from each other, p=.54. EDSA 2 (Low Threat: M=11.56) is in 
the middle, and EDSA 4 (Low Threat: M=8.39) is lowest, with all EDSAs except 1 and 3 
statistically differing from each other, ps<.05 (Omnibus ANOVA: F(3, 206)=21.56, p<.001). For 
affiliation density, EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat: M=5.18), EDSA 3 (High Threat: M=3.67), and 
EDSA 4 (Low Threat: M=3.46) do not statistically differ from each other, ps>.15. However, 
EDSA 2 (Low Threat: M=8.04) is significantly higher in affiliation imagery compared to all 
other EDSAs, ps<.05 (Omnibus ANOVA: F(3, 206)=6.19, p<.001). For achievement density, 
EDSA 1 (Moderate Threat: M=6.91) is the highest, while EDSA 3 (High Threat: M=2.76) is the 
lowest, p=.006. EDSA 4 (Low Threat: M=4.42) also differs from EDSA 1, p=.05, but EDSA 2 
(Low Threat: M=4.97) does not statistically differ from any other EDSA, ps>.11 (Omnibus 
ANOVA: F(3, 206)=2.69, p=.046). 
